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Sierra Leone:
The Rise And Fall Of Valentine Strasser
And
The Rise To Power
Of Julius Maada Bio
By Mohamed Yahya Sillah
One year after a rebellious group called Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched a deadly assault on Sierra Leone in 1991, a young captain in the Sierra Leone Military Forces, named Valentine Esegragbo Melvine Strasser, led a military coup that overthrew the “civilian” government of the All People’s Congress (APC) President Joseph Saidu Momoh on April 29, 1992. Valentine Strasser became the youngest Head of State in the world at that time just three days after his 25th birthday.
In interviews for this article, a senior Sierra Leonean Military Officer revealed that at the time of the rebel incursion in 1991, Sierra Leone had only 3,000 soldiers, most of who were poorly trained for the kind of war that confronted them. He said the military lacked modern weaponry necessary to subjugate the jungle warfare that the rebels brought into Sierra Leone.
“The country’s arsenal had outdated Second World War weapons mainly donated by Nigeria,” he said, adding, “the morale in the military was low, with command and control structure lacking.”
Former president Joseph Saidu Momoh, overthrown by Valentine Strasser in 1992.
Contrary to speculations that the soldiers overthrew Momoh for lack of food, another senior military officer that was part of the cabal told me they staged the coup because they saw their efforts on the battlefront compromised due to adverse conditions under which they executed the war.
“We realized that if we did not take over the country at the time, the rebels would. They were better equipped and better trained for jungle war,” said the officer. He said the soldiers did not overthrow Momoh because “we hated him. We got rid of his government and their establishment to save our nation from anarchy.” Unfortunately, more than 100 persons died that day when Guinea dispatched soldiers to reverse the coup to save Momoh’s government. The Guineans failed. Momoh fled to Conakry, leading Strasser and his group to announce the formation of what they called the “National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC).”
Strasser and his colleagues won national and international support for the coup. Many Sierra Leoneans supported the coup because they felt that Momoh’s government was inept, unprepared, even unwilling to stop the rebels from decimating the country. People believed also that since the rebels’ goal was to overthrow the corrupt APC government, the Strasser
Valentine Strasser (in goggles) being hailed by wives of police and army shortly after staging a successful coup against the APC government of Joseph Saidu Momoh, 1992.
coup might have done the job for them, and therefore, the rebellion would end and peace would return to the nation.
The NPRC began to fortify its powers, leading Sierra Leoneans to believe that the military situation and security conditions in the country would improve. Unfortunately, the RUF continued the conflict with acts of brutality against innocent civilians, while they gradually disempowered the military.
Nevertheless, unlike the Momoh administration that refused to negotiate with the rebels, the military junta was willing to open dialogue with the rebels to end the conflict. The junta sought regional and other international involvements to help end the crisis in the country. The Strasser regime dispatched emissaries even to the United States of America to seek possibilities for lasting peace in Sierra Leone.
For instance, in March 1995, at the request of Head of State, Captain Valentine Strasser, I was privileged to host a three-man high-level peace-seeking delegation in Atlanta, Georgia, with support of the Carter Center in Atlanta. I hosted the delegation under the auspices of The Africa Peace Foundation, an organization I founded in 1994 in the United States of America as a Conflict Resolution Institution.
The delegation comprised of Mr. Samuel Maligi II, the NPRC Secretary of State for Internal Affairs and Rural Development, Madam Florence Dillsworth, the Head of the Committee of Management, Freetown City Council and Mr. David Quee, then Barrister-at-Law and Solicitor (may their Souls rest in Perfect Peace).
Meanwhile, as the search for peace progressed, the international community pressured the NPRC junta to leverage their popularity and transit the country to democratic governance. In 1995, the military government invited Sierra Leoneans to form political parties for democratic elections. Sierra Leoneans in the country and abroad formed several political parties to contest presidential and parliamentary elections slated for 1996. Unfortunately, the United Revolutionary Front (RUF) refused to accept any attempt at holding elections in the country in the midst of a war. However, the NPRC remained determined to conducting the elections at the exclusion of RUF support.
ELECTIONS AND THE WAR
In the heat of electioneering in 1996, the RUF continued atrocities around the country to discourage people from participating in the elections. As the mayhem continued, reports filtered into communities around the country that the NPRC planned to postpone the elections for ‘security reasons’. Obviously, the reports created fear and uneasiness among the population. because the people were eager to rid themselves of military rule.
In reality, the Supreme Council of State, the body that ruled Sierra Leone in the NPRC regime, was divided over handing power to a civilian administration. There were members in the Supreme Council of State that strongly supported abdicating power following the elections. They believed it was important to do so in order that the regime could exit the political scene with credibility to vouch the international support they seemingly enjoyed.
Conversely, other members believed civilians were incapable of winning the war against the rebels. They believed that some soldiers might attempt a military coup against a civilian government, thereby creating possibilities for the rebels to invade the capital in a battle for power. That group sided with those that opposed a transfer of power to a democratic administration.
Then, there was a conservative group. That group distrusted politicians all together. They believed that politicians would ruin the country through corruption, thereby reversing any progress the NPRC might have made to ‘improve Sierra Leone’. Reports said Valentine Strasser, the military Head of State, was among the conservative group.
Meanwhile, in the height of political activities, rumors circulated that Strasser was interested in contesting the election as a civilian candidate for president. He would do so under the banner of the National Unity Party (NUP), the political party the military regime helped create and was supporting financially. Political observers, however, felt that Strasser’s intentions, if true, were contradictory to assurances he had given earlier to the Chairman of the Interim National Electoral Commission that he (Strasser) would step down as Head of State for a civilian administration after the elections.
However, some members of the ruling NPRC believed that pressure from Strasser’s relatives and few members of the Supreme Council of State overwhelmed Strasser to a level that made him reconsider his earlier position of not contesting the election. Certain individuals close to Strasser even launched a furtive campaign among Supreme Council of State members to support Strasser’s interest in staying in power. Concerns deepened when the genteel lobbying later transformed into intimidations, they said. In fact, some council members were upset one afternoon when Strasser’s mother displayed banners at an NUP political convention that read, “No Strasser, No Sierra Leone!” “No Strasser, No NUP!”
That was ironic, however, because a few days before the convention, Strasser declined a request from some of his colleagues to declare his candidacy for the NUP leadership. He was adamant also that the election must proceed as planned. Strasser knew that although he was Head of State, he was disqualified constitutionally from contesting the elections for civilian president because of his age. Strasser was born on April 26, 1967.
Section 53 of the national Constitution stipulates that “A person shall be qualified for election as President of Sierra Leone if ‘he has attained the age of forty years’.” Strasser was just in his mid-twenties.
An advisory Committee that Strasser had appointed recommended also an enforcement of that electoral requirement to limit any person below the age of 40 from contesting the elections as a presidential candidate. The Supreme Council of State, with Strasser as Chairman, approved that recommendation. It became part of the electoral laws of Sierra Leone.
Ironically, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, who later became leader of the Sierra Leone Peoples Party and, subsequently, President of Sierra Leone after the elections, headed that Advisory Committee. Kabbah was 64 years old at the beginning of his first presidential term in 1996.
Meanwhile, Supreme Council of State members became somewhat acrimonious when the NPRC Vice Head of State, Julius Maada Bio, informed them that Strasser had threatened to exterminate Bio’s position as Vice Head of State if he did not yield to Strasser’s desire to stay in power. The threat seemingly led Bio and other key members of the Supreme Council of State to decide on dislodging Strasser from power.
Was Strasser actually interested in derailing the elections? Was he planning to eliminate Bio? Did he decide to stay in power against the will of the people? Answers to such questions may be only conjectural.
However, key diplomats in Freetown confirmed intelligence reports that pointed a rather sharp finger at Bio, not Strasser, as one with the desire to let the NPRC stay in power.
Conspiracy against Strasser came to play when some Supreme Council of State members straddled the issue of assassinating the youthful Valentine Strasser or simply removing him from power in a palace coup.
After serious consideration, they decided on toppling Strasser and banishing him from Sierra Leone to a foreign country with a diplomatic passport. The passport, they felt, would allow Strasser to travel to any country that might be willing to grant him political asylum.
In spite of that option, three members of the Supreme Council were opposed to simply removing Strasser from power. They assigned themselves the task of assassinating Strasser.
One night, the three men went to Strasser’s residence on the pretext of a casual visit. They were fully armed and prepared to execute their plan.
However, the men abandoned their plan of killing Strasser when they entered the building. They refused to “wear the blood of their leader” on their hands when they found Strasser intoxicated and almost incoherent.
“I could not see myself shooting a drunken man to death, especially a man we all considered as a friend,” one of them told me.. The three decided to help remove Strasser from power without killing him. In conversations with Strasser, the men created a scenario to lure him into believing they would support any move that would remove restrictions on the age limit to qualify Strasser contest the elections. They suggested to him the need for a special council meeting to address the age issue. Although Strasser earlier had declined suggestions to contest the elections, he readily understood the significance of such a meeting that could pave the way to his “presidency,” said one of the men.
Unfortunately, that council meeting, if called, would be Strasser’s last official appearance as Head of State at such forum. In his sobriety, Strasser was convinced he had won the support of key council members to back his thrust to the presidency. With that assurance, he scheduled the council meeting at military headquarters for Tuesday, January 16, 1996. All council members in Freetown would be present. Already, the plot to overthrow Strasser at that meeting had been hatched.
Although the plot was sprinkled with absolute secrecy, the planners succeeded in convincing Strasser’s Chief Security Officer (CFO), Patrick Amara Quagore, to join the cabal. Quagore was in charge of the presidential guard at Cabassa Lodge, the official residence of Valentine Strasser. Outside of military circles, the only civilian that knew of the plot was late Steve Bio, the brother of then Vice Head of State, Julius Maada Bio. Steve Bio’s Russian piloted helicopter would be used to transport Strasser in handcuffs to neighbouring Guinea.
Valentine Strasser went to the council meeting on that fateful Tuesday, convinced that the road to his presidency would germinate from the halls of that meeting. Outside Military Headquarters, Body Guards stood at attention – Guards that would act only on orders. In front of the building was the helicopter already designated to fly Strasser out of the country. The Russian pilot in the cockpit waited only for orders to lift the chopper with Strasser buckled to his seat. Inside the halls of the meeting, council members accorded Strasser the usual respect and protocols that greeted him whenever he appeared with them at such gatherings.
Before the meeting, Strasser asked council member, Idris Kamara, to offer prayers. May be Kamara’s prayer changed the future of Sierra Leone forever.
“Lord, help us this day,” Kamara started his prayer. “Whatever decision and action we’re going to take here, Lord, we pray that it will be in the interest of this country, Sierra Leone. Protect and guide us. We’re going to do a very important thing here today, Lord. Amen.”
Strasser and others hailed the prayer, calling it “wonderful.”
Indeed, the prayer was a wonder, only full of ominous black clouds hanging over Strasser. The NPRC Chairman called for minutes of the last meeting. It was read. Then he immediately called for discussions on the age issue. Suddenly a very senior member of the council stood, took out a pistol and pointed it at Valentine Strasser. Strasser attempted to jump over the table to dock the impending shot . At that moment, another council member raced from his seat at the back of the hall and landed on Strasser’s chest, throwing him over the table . A serious wrestling ensued between the two as others watched.
As the tussle continued, Strasser realized he was in the midst of a conspiracy that would abrogate his power. While he struggled to save his life, or may be his power, Strasser realized also that all council members he felt were his closest friends abandoned him and watched his unilateral struggle for life. Suddenly, someone fired a gun in the hall. A bullet hit one council member named King Harman in the leg although he was not a part of the scuffling team. No one knew the origin of the shooting.
Finally, the men overpowered Strasser and shackled him. Council member, Idris Kamara, briskly steered Strasser out of the hall to the waiting helicopter and strapped the fallen Head of State to a seat. In a domineering disposition, Idris Kamara commanded the Russian pilot to “take off!” The usually allegiant military guards did not resist or intervene to rescue the shackled Strasser. The pilot lifted the helicopter, releasing a tornado of whirled dust on bystanders. Idris Kamara and another council member named Charles Baryoh, flew Strasser out of Sierra Leone to the Republic of Guinea.
Meanwhile, in preparation of the outcome of events at the so-called emergency meeting, Vice Head of State Julius Maada Bio, earlier falsely informed the Guinean government that an ‘official Sierra Leone delegation’ would arrive in Conakry that day. Actually, he was keeping the Guineans alert on the unceremonious arrival of the dethroned Valentine Strasser.
Shortly afterwards, the helicopter landed at the international airport in Conakry. Guinean government officials were at hand to observe the protocol of welcoming the “official delegation”. The Guineans’ excitement turned into dismay, if not total shock, when they saw that the ‘official delegation’ from Sierra Leone was actually a dethroned Head of State deposited on Guinean soil in shackles. Among the welcoming team at the airport, was the NPRC Ambassador to Guinea, Commander Jabbie. He also was a member of the Supreme Council of State. Ironically he was completely unaware of developments in Freetown. Ambassador Jabbie could not muffle his astonishment and emotions. He visibly wept at the sight of seeing Strasser in shackles. The bewildered Strasser was driven to the Sierra Leone Embassy still in cuffs. There, the accompanying NPRC members handed him over to the Guinean Minister of Defense as a ‘persona non grata’ in Sierra Leone. Strasser served as Head of State from 1992-1996
In Freetown, Supreme Council of State members immediately transferred power to Julius Maada Bio as the nation’s new Head of State.
The NPRC Director of Defense Information, Lieutenant Colonel Karifa Kargbo, announced on national radio that the council removed Strasser from power to disallow him from derailing the elections and smudging the democratic process. He said, however, that the new regime under Bio was suspending the electoral process.
Shortly afterwards, certain group of Sierra Leoneans demanded the elections be postponed with a call for what they coined “peace before elections”. The group was composed of chiefs, provincial community leaders, people caught up in the war zones and activists in the capital, Freetown. The ‘peace before election’ advocates felt that the scheduled elections would be disproportional because the rebels threatened to disrupt the process.
On the other hand, pressure groups, particularly among women and political parties, called for the elections to proceed on February 26, 1996 in accordance with agreements in an August 1995 National Consultative Conference.
The new Head of State, Brigadier-General Julius Maada Bio, found himself in a sort of quandary. He met with executives of the Interim National Electoral Commission in the first week of February 1996 to discuss what was becoming a national crisis. Bio and the group reached a consensus to reconvene the National Consultative Conference on February 12, 1996. The goal was to discuss the election dilemma. The re-convened conference, known as Bintumani II, brought together political parties, non-governmental organizations, religious bodies, paramount chiefs, as well as the army and police. During the conference, majority of the speakers, including representatives from people worst affected by the war, felt that the elections must be held as planned on February 26, 1996. Only 14 speakers opposed the “election before peace” movement. With prospects of the military derailing the planned election, the people reposed their trust in the Interim National Electoral Commission, (INEC). People hoped that INEC, headed mainly by civilians, would not compromise its authority and betray the confidence of the electorate.
Indeed, INEC stood the test of time. It took a firm position to ensure that the military did not succeed in using “influence and intimidation” to derail the election.
At the Bintumani II Conference, INEC Chairman, Dr. James Jonah, intrepidly advocated democracy and the need for the military to abdicate.
Meanwhile, the Army Chief of Defense Staff created a scare in the halls of the Conference when he stated that the army could not “provide the necessary security during the elections and fight the RUF at the same time”. That statement, however, did not stop the halls of Bintumani ringing with national acclamation that the elections must proceed as scheduled. It was clear that the people’s resolve for change in the nation’s leadership machinery was far more than common.
Subsequently, in a bold and stately manner, Brigadier-General Maada Bio announced on February 13, 1996 that the elections would proceed as the people willed. He ordered the army to provide the necessary security to all Sierra Leoneans on polling days. However, the RUF refused to recognize the election schedule and threatened to disrupt the entire electoral process. Nevertheless, in spite of all the battles, both on the war front and on the political stages, the elections were held on February 26, 1996.
About the author: Mohamed Yahya Sillah is President and Publisher of African World News Global Report, published by MYSIL MEDIA, INC. He was a Presidential Candidate, 1996 in Sierra Leone.